Banned presentation from mit students about how to perform subway attack

http://file.wikileaks.org/file/anatomy-of-a-subway-hack.pdf

Summary

Documentation for Boston T subway system. The file, created in June, 2008 using PowerPoint by Russell Ryan, Zach Anderson, Alessandro Chiesa, demonstrates lax security, failed security, and no security in an area of public transportation that the most people would consider "safe". The 87 page document shows the relative ease one can gain entry to the system and exploit it to gain relatively free access for subway use. Sabotage of the system is, along with exploitation, an easy task due to the poor security. In early August, the authors were prevented from giving a scheduled presentation [1] at DEFCON by a federal judge in a injunction filed by the Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority (MBTA). The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) defended the students who had made an effort to contact the MBTA prior to their scheduled Defcon appearance. The temporary restraining order against the authors did not stop MIT's student newspaper from posting a copy of the presentation that had been included on a Defcon CD that had been distributed.

The File Details How To:

Generate stored-value fare cards
Reverse engineer magstripes
Hack RFID cards
Use software radio to sniff
Use FPGAs to brute force
Tap into the fare vending network
Social engineer
Warcart

ref:
1.https://wikileaks.org/wiki/Anatomy_of_a_Subway_Hack_2008

如果探讨如何攻击公共设施属于学术自由而不属于恐怖主义，宣扬攻击公共设施的言论属于言论自由而不属于恐怖主义，那么还有什么不是自由？在袭击发生以后再追究责任是绝对不可取的。现代电子系统的安全性严重依赖Security by obscurity，在开发过程中几乎不可能做到完全不存在漏洞，因此需要通过隐瞒某些关键的技术细节，达到防止漏洞被发现、被利用的目标。而刻意揭露这些细节就是对这一安全措施最大的攻击，即便并非出于恶意，也应当受到限制。